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Dewey and Habermas: Re-reading Ethics for Adult Education 
 
Davin Carr-Chellman 
Pennsylvania State University, USA 
 
 Abstract: The relevance of  Dewey and Habermas's ethics for adult 
education is grounded in epistemology and learning, in particular delineating the 
centrality of ethics -- normative conceptions of right and wrong -- to how we come 
to know and understand the world, generate meaning, and hence, learn.   
 
There has been interesting and important research into how we learn about ethics: from 
Kohlberg to Brookfield.  An important corollary to this scholarly pursuit, and one of particular 
interest to adult education,  focuses instead on the ethics of learning: understanding better what 
happens when we learn, while also fleshing out the relevance of ethics for the quality of that 
learning. My argument is that the heart of the relationship between ethics and learning is 
intersubjectivity and the moral demands that flow from that intersubjectivity --  an ethics of 
intersubjectivity, perhaps.  Dewey and Habermas both have ethical theories that are grounded in 
epistemological intersubjectivity, or the notion that our knowledge of the world and ourselves is 
social in origin, the upshot being that our capacity and opportunities to learn are directly tied to 
the nature of our social relations.  Learning, then, is clearly important to ethical development in 
that we do learn how to be ethical.  What we should also consider is how the ethical character and 
quality of our intersubjectivity directs our learning.  Theorizing learning in this way has 
implications for the moral and emancipatory potential of our social institutions.   
  The initial entry into the nexus of Dewey and Habermas' ethics and adult educations is 
intersubjectivity.  "It is this that is Hegel's great idea since it reveals how ethical life matters 
independent of any particular moral norms, laws, ideals, principles, or ends.  Ethical life is not, in 
the first instance, about moral principles, but about the ways in which both particular actions and 
whole forms of action injure, wound, and deform recipient and actor alike; it is about the secret 
bonds connecting our weal and woe to the lives of all those around us" (Bernstein, 2003). 
Intersubjectivity is a core notion in late 20th - early 21st century social theory, perhaps the core 
notion (Lotz, 2006).  Questions at the heart of this inquiry into intersubjectivity include, for 
example, 'who is the other?,' 'What is the other?,' and 'Does the other precede me?,'  and any 
serious approach to social philosophy must reckon with the content of this area. The argument 
around which these questions revolve declares that concepts such as consciousness, self, and 
subjectivity only make sense if they are viewed as social concepts: the colloquially solipsistic 
characteristics of consciousness, i.e. I have consciousness of the turkey dinner in front of me; self, 
i.e. I understand my-self as an empathetic creature; and subjectivity, i.e. I have subjectivity 
because my interpretation of events is most powerful in my world view; are only useful and 
ameliorative to society if understood as primarily generated through other things.  For Dewey and 
Habermas, experience -- generated through other things -- is mediated (not immediate), causing 
Copernican turns in our epistemological foundations.  In other words, coming to know things 
about ourselves (consciousness) and coming to know things about the world requires an-other to 
read back to us the meanings of our actions.  The common thread between Dewey and Habermas 
is Hegel and the mediated nature of self-consciousness that he outlines in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit (1979).   This common thread constitutes the ethics of intersubjectivity.  
For Habermas, the Hegelian influence of the dialectic of intersubjectivity is well-documented and 
foundational to his approach to communicative rationality and ethics as a direct antidote to 
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instrumental rationality.  J.M. Bernstein, a prominent scholar of Habermas and Critical Theory, 
makes this apparent,  
Whereas the validity of rules of instrumental action has an empirical backing, the validity of social norms 'is 
grounded in the intersubjectivity of the mutual understanding of intentions and secured by the general 
recognition of obligations.'  In the domain of instrumental reason, then, the world is constituted in terms of a 
polarity of subject and object, where what makes something an 'object' is precisely the application of 
instrumental rules and reasoning to it; while in communicative action there is always an assumption of 
reciprocity between self and other, ego and alter-ego. . .According to Habermas, all human subjectivity, that 
is, all experiences by individuals of themselves as distinct persons, is grounded in intersubjectivity.  Self-
awareness does not arise through isolated, private acts of introspection or self-reflection.  Rather, one begins 
to see oneself only through becoming aware of how others see one.  This complex accomplishment occurs 
above all through language.  The framework of communicative action is that within which human beings are 
constituted as self-conscious subjects  (1995, 42-43).  
As opposed to Habermas, Dewey was not part of the tradition of critical theory that guided 
Habermas, and he did not inherit the notion of identity thinking and instrumental rationality as a 
primary ethical problem. Another important difference is that, while Habermas and Dewey share 
a common intellectual forebear in Hegel, Dewey struggled throughout his long professional life 
to become an anti-dialectical thinker, working to overcome dualities rather than engage them. 
Consequently, the intellectual relationship between Dewey and Hegel, and also Dewey and 
Habermas is more complicated.  But the relationship is there, and does carry significant potential 
for theorizing emancipatory adult education.  There exists a common 
phenomenological beginning -- Hegel's Phenomenology -- which highlights the Hegelian 
movement at the heart of Dewey and Habermas' ethics: the causality of fate which pushes ethics 
into the primary position -- ethics as first philosophy.  This means that what Hegel had to say 
about knowledge, reason, and objectivity, for example, must be read through the dynamics of 
ethical life.  The Hegelian causality of fate lives on in Habermas and Dewey via the central 
notion of the intersubjective construction of self-consciousness.  
   John Dewey's ethical theory, often maligned as narrowly instrumental and 
consequentialist (Aiken, 1962, p.83), provides remarkably provocative and fertile ground on 
which to base a fresh interpretation of the learning transaction such that human subjectivity is 
enhanced rather than diminished.  "The problem," says Dewey, "of restoring integration and 
cooperation between man's (sic) beliefs about the world in which he lives and his beliefs about 
the values and purposes that should direct his conduct is the deepest problem of modern life.  It is 
the problem of any philosophy that is not isolated from that life" (Dewey, 1960a, p. 255).  At an 
important juncture in his development as a scholar, Dewey fell under the influence of William 
James' Principles of Psychology (1952), marking the final point of departure from Hegelianism.  
James showed that all mental activity is purposeful, originating in and guided by the efforts of a 
living creature to adapt to changing environmental conditions.  For Dewey, this marks the 
beginning of his mature ethical philosophy in which a detailed analysis of the actual processes of 
inquiry lead to the formation of particular moral judgments. The ultimate goal for Dewey was to 
conceive of ethical theory, indeed all theory, as something generated from within practice and in 
response to practice.  He wished to illuminate the human situation as radically experiential such 
that the inherent resources and constraints of such experience could be located and utilized.  The 
result would be individuals and communities better equipped to solve their own problems.  As 
such, theory is no longer imposed on practice from the outside, but becomes instead a genuine 
part of the means for the intelligent amelioration of practice.  Dewey’s prescription is that one 
cannot determine what an adequate ethical theory will be without examining what kind of moral 
theory works better in our actual lives. Dewey did not prescribe universal moral imperatives, 
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rather he elucidated and explained forms of behavior most beneficial to human beings in coping 
with problematic situations. "To find the guidance for rectifying a particular situation, it is 
necessary to give up looking for a universal theoretical formula and get on to the difficult task of 
studying, 'the needs and alternative possibilities lying within a unique and localized situation' 
[Dewey, 1930, p. 196]" (Pappas, 1998, p. 105).  Dewey thus advocated an approach to moral 
decision-making that may be termed 'situational.'  The implication is not that we ignore or deny 
any ethical knowledge or guidance (because experience is intellectually cumulative -- there are 
stabilities in experience, something Dewey referred to as continuity), but that this prior 
experience alone does not have normative force: it must meet the demands of the current 
problematic situation.   Pappas characterizes Dewey's ethical theory as advocating a moral life 
that is intelligent because it educates itself,, aesthetic because it proceeds in a meaningful mode of 
engagement, and democratic because it engages a certain kind of community and communication 
(1998, p. 116). The ultimate goal for Dewey was solving the genuine problems of human beings 
by increasing opportunities for growth: "The central factor in moral judgment is the growth of the 
self: the cultivation of habits and dispositions that will sustain the capacity for intelligent choice" 
(Johnstone, 190). Conduct is understood as a product of the self.  "The real moral question is 
what kind of a self is being furthered and formed.  And this question arises with respect to both 
one's own self and the selves of others" (Dewey, 1960b, p. 159).  Johnstone goes on to explain the 
moral imperative of Dewey's notion of 'the growth of the self':  
 
The self is formed, Dewey argues by the choices it makes and by the experiences that flow from them.  … 
Choice also forms the self by determining the nature of the experience to which it will be led by its own 
acts.  On this view, any choice can give formative impulse to the developing self, and thus can have moral 
import.  When we attempt to remake the world in ways that will institute our values, we remake ourselves.  
Because growth is the 'only moral end,' the obligation attending any attempt to respond to the problematic in 
life is to look for methods of doing so that will respect the demand for growth (Johnstone, 190).  
 
The moral imperative of growth, as it is pursued through inquiry and the method of intelligence, 
is also inescapably social: problematic situations are by nature social situations.  Dewey, 
especially in his educational writings, constantly emphasizes that the growth of the personality 
and the generation of the conditions most conducive to that growth is fundamentally a social 
quest: "Morality is social [because] the formation of habits of belief, desire, and judgment is 
going on at every moment under the influence of conditions set by men's [sic] contact, 
intercourse, and association's with one another" (Dewey, 1930, p. 295).  Clearly Dewey's radical 
empiricism necessarily entails intersubjectivity, but we can really see it working in the social 
nature of morality.  Intersubjectivity is the mutual constitution of subject and object on the social 
level.  Implicit in Dewey's understanding of experience as radically empirical is the mediated and 
social formation of intelligence. The upshot is that Dewey focuses on communication 
as necessary to maximizing our potential as learners, and, consequently, as ethical creatures. This 
characteristic, with remnants of the Hegelian dialectic, had direct influence on George Herbert 
Mead.  In turn, Mead and American pragmatism carried great influence on the ethics of Jurgen 
Habermas. 
Jurgen Habermas is arguably the most influential philosopher and social theorist of the 
last 30 years.  His ideas, particularly the notion of communicative rationality and ethics, have 
been adopted by scholars in nearly every sphere of the human and social sciences.  In the field of 
adult education, his influence on Mezirow's theory of transformational learning has been 
prominent, but, in the last decade or so, Habermas's influence has moved beyond transformational 
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learning -- even as that focus within adult education has also broadened significantly -- to other 
scholars seeking to open pathways to emancipatory education.  Perhaps the most well-known and 
representative product of this Habermasian movement in adult education is Michael Welton's 
edited text, In Defense of the Lifeworld: Critical Perspectives on Adult Learning (1995).  
Welton's own essay in the text offers some explanation of Habermas' significance to adult 
education: "Habermas' work is of central importance for critical educational theory and practice.  
Of all contemporary theorists, Habermas is the one person who has consistently and consciously 
placed individual and social learning processes at the core of his massive project" (p. 136).  
Writing more recently, Stephen Brookfield argues that adult learning is an integral part of 
Habermas' move beyond Marx in reconstructing society in the twenty-first century, "Here the 
centrality of learning -- particularly adult learning -- clearly emerges.  If a distinguishing 
characteristic of humans is their capacity to learn, then social science and educational 
theoreticians need to focus much more centrally on how adults learn to create a more moral, just 
democracy" (2005, p. 223).  Characteristically, Welton makes this notion more concrete by 
arguing that, "Habermas' sociological theory (his dualistic model of the system and the lifeworld) 
and theory of rationalization (his view of the historical unfolding of learning potential  in 
modernity) provide us with the necessary boundary frame and constituent conceptual elements 
for the study of social learning processes" (1995, p. 134).  Not to be confused with Bandura's 
social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986), Welton's notion of social learning is very 
Deweyan/Habermasian in scope: "The new, or emergent social learning paradigm, would 
construct the boundary of the field as wide as society itself, and would include everything that 
forms the outlook, character, and actions of communicative agents in space and time.  All of 
society is a vast school" (1995, p. 134).   
  Accordingly, much like Dewey, ethics is central to Habermas' entire philosophy, which 
makes it both difficult to tease-out, and also tremendously important to adult learning.  "For 
Habermas, then, 'a critical theory of society can no longer be constructed in the exclusive form of 
a critique of political economy' [quoting Habermas, 1970, P. 120].  It must broaden its concern to 
investigate matters of morality and communication and how a democratic society might organize 
itself to promote the fullest and freest communication possible among its members. . .This has led 
him to engage with American pragmatism. . ." (Brookfield, 2005, P. 224).  Sounding very much 
like Dewey, it has also led him to affirm the possibility of reestablishing reason to serve the 
creation of humane democracy. "In Postmetaphysical Thinking (Habermas, 1992b. p. 114), he 
states as his aim, 'to defend and make fruitful for social theory a concept of reason that attends to 
the phenomenon of the lifeworld and permits the consciousness of society as a whole. . .to be 
reformulated on a basis of a theory of intersubjectivity. . . Habermas' view of critical theory ' 
retains a concept of reason which asserts itself simultaneously against both scientific mutilation 
and existentialist downgrading, and which is furthermore also critically applied to itself' 
(Habermas, 1992a, p. 55)" (Brookfield, 2005, p. 227).  Using a theory of  intersubjectivity, 
Habermas develops his communicative rationality and discourse ethics as the primary method of 
rescuing the 'lifeworld' from the deadening force of instrumental reason.   
  Interestingly enough, it is precisely the 'call and response,' 'pitch and catch' characteristics 
of communication that Habermas identifies as the motive force in individual moral 
development: the development of the Habermasian "moral point of view" -- largely coterminous 
with Kohlberg's third and final stage of moral development called post-conventional interaction 
(Kohlberg et al., 1983) -- describes individuals capable of recognizing the fallible nature of their 
convictions even as they continue to act on them, always enlightening their own self-
understandings with the perspectives of others.  This is the very same intersubjective core 
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operating in Dewey's ethics, resulting in a very strong sense that, for Dewey and Habermas, to the 
extent we are able to act with a constant reference to mutuality, recognition, and reciprocity in 
our communication, we will learn/grow most effectively.  
Welton and Brookfield each point to Habermas as opening doors for truly 
emancipatory institutions within a more moral democracy.  I argue that Dewey, properly 
interpreted and creatively applied, stands shoulder-to-shoulder with Habermas in this work.   To 
illustrate more precisely how their ethical theories open these doors and why adult learning is the 
engine driving the process, let's look at an ethical problem; an ethical problem that is, at the same 
time, a learning problem.   As adult educators, I will argue that this ethical problem is among the 
most pernicious and debilitating of any we currently face -- the broadly experienced ignorance or 
avoidance of acts of genuine human subjectivity.  
Genuine human subjectivity is risky, and our efforts to avoid it are well documented.  The 
stakes are high: denial of this risk is at the very source of the dehumanizing tendencies so 
prominent in late modern or post-modern existence, as exemplified by the bureaucratic 
rationalization and commodification of nearly every slice of contemporary life.  "The world is not 
made up of certainties (2003, p. 361)," Freire says, but the urge to harness and tease some 
certainties out of our uncertain human raw material -- the urge to eliminate the risk of living a 
human life -- brings us to a blind reliance on science, technology, and statistics (for example), as 
well as an uninformed dispassionate acceptance of existing, reified power structures.  Maybe this 
drive to overcome human entropy is ingrained in our DNA, but I don't think so.  Certainly, we are 
constantly striving to better understand the world, to make sense of the apparently arbitrary 
events that happen to us, e.g. a bout with cancer, a car accident, or even a student's refusal to 
engage classroom material.  But this honest striving to understand has morphed into deterministic 
scientism, creating for us lives and social contexts that, while appearing entirely rational, in fact 
only serve to alienate us from each other and ourselves.  Walker Percy describes this alienation  
saying, "science cannot utter a single word about an individual molecule, thing, or creature 
insofar as it is an individual, but only insofar as it is like other individuals" (1975).  Put another 
way, he means that your cancer is only understandable and, thus, treatable, to the extent that it is 
statistically like other episodes of cancer.  Your particular and individual cancer is meaningless.  
This logic has useful results for some things and purposes, but certainly not all -- or even most -- 
things and purposes, and most certainly not most human things and purposes.  This logic 
represses the idiosyncratic nature of the best of what we call human, performing a dangerous 
ideological violence on all upsurges of genuine individuality or genuine subjectivity.  Never mind 
that it attempts to overcome a fundamental reality of human existence: change, uncertainty, risk, 
or what Freire describes when he says that "the world is made of the tension between the certain 
and the uncertain" (2003, p. 361).  This logic is called instrumental rationality, and, while it has 
generated economic wealth and scientific advances, it has done so at great cost.  At the risk of 
overstating the case, in this situation, the irrationality we associate with something like fascist 
totalitarianism is already present within the action of subjective rationality and self-expression.  
Genuine subjectivity is impossible because we are all already subsumed by ideological 
subjectivity, which consequently, precludes forms of reason that empower individuals to imagine 
deep notions of democracy and justice.  This is an ethical problem with an educational solution. 
  Those of us curious about what might be called an emancipatory adult education practice 
need to understand this important ethical challenge to learning, theorize the learning transaction 
in a way that recognizes and seeks to ameliorate the ethical challenge of instrumental rationality, 
and develops practices that reassert the uncertainty of human existence.  Freire has coined an apt 
phrase for what kind of learning must happen: we must "learn to read the world before learning to 
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read the word" (Freire, P. & Macedo, D., 2003).  By learning to read the world, we can make 
explicit the history of cultural production and reproduction that has arbitrarily constructed a 
particular social position based on race, class, gender, or sexuality. Reading the world in this way 
communicates a sense of agency to those who have been arbitrarily, yet systematically, 
disempowered by the reified social structures created by enlightenment rationality.   
The work of Habermas in developing communicative rationality -- as opposed to 
instrumental or enlightenment rationality -- has been the primary theoretical move to locate 'a 
more encompassing reason grounded in being.'  In this way (and in many others), Habermas 
remains a product of the Frankfurt School, an intellectual heir to Horkheimer and Adorno, and a 
(perhaps the) luminary in contemporary Critical Theory.  But Habermas has also moved in 
broader directions to aid his search for a new type of rationality: appropriately enough, he came 
to the new world for a fresh theoretical perspective, relying on a Chicago Pragmatist as 
foundational to his vision -- George Herbert Mead.  Consequently, the groundwork has been set 
for a strong ethical antidote to our fear of genuine human subjectivity.  Through the interstices of 
Deweyan and Habermasian ethics we can arrive at a Freirean emancipatory adult education:  it is 
precisely a Freirean "reading of the world," that Dewey and Habermas' ethics can help us 
approach.  In this direction, a solid beginning point is the recognition that emancipatory education 
is about communication.  Freire's pedagogy of freedom is an elegant and humane form of 
communication that seeks to provide some substance to our claims of emancipation.  For Freire, 
critical, emancipatory pedagogy is both a producer and a product of democracy, while 
communication is the modus operandi through which the dialectic of "learner" and "teacher," and 
"subject" and "object" operates and constructs the genuine subjectivity required for substantive 
democracy to be realized.  Freire says, "To think correctly implies the existence of subjects 
whose thinking is mediated by objects that provoke and modify the thinking subject.  Thinking 
correctly is, in other words, not an isolated act. . .but an act of communication. . .something that 
belongs essentially to the process of co participation" (1998, p. 42).   
 Communication understood this way involves us constantly in a "permanent process of social 
and historical construction and reconstruction" (Freire, 1998, p.38).  This process is critical self-
reflection, and, accordingly, its participants understand that it can only be realized, not simply 
through other people, but through other people necessarily regarded and respected as 'subjects,' 
equal participants in the creation of knowledge and the educative experience.  The ". . .mutual 
adjustment and coordination whereby a vague or indeterminate situation becomes clearer," as 
Alexander paraphrases Dewey, is the product of a critical and emancipatory pedagogy; the very 
same pedagogy that Freire calls a pedagogy of freedom.  The designation 'freedom' is earned 
when the participants in this process can look back on their pedagogical intersubjective 
transaction and see that they have made the world better by communicating in a non-
authoritarian, mutually beneficial way; a way that, by default, recognizes and respects the deeply 
contextual nature of learning.  This pedagogy of freedom can't help but add some substance to 
our formal democracy, chipping away -- perhaps -- at the ideological edifice of instrumental 
rationality.  
  
